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"PREEMPTIVE WAR": IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL?
John B. Mitchell*
On March 19, 2003, at 2200 hours (EST), the United
States launched a full-scale military attack against the sover-
eign state of Iraq. Iraq had neither attacked the United
States, nor was in the final stages of preparing for such an
assault. For the first time in its 214-year history, the United
States of America had begun a preemptive war.'
As early as May 2002 at West Point, President Bush
spoke about the use of "preemption" in a speech on combating
terrorism.' Subsequently, the administration maintained the
position that Iraq's leadership must be eliminated because
the Ba'ath regime continued to develop weapons of mass de-
struction, and might use those weapons against an opponent,
or might supply them to terrorist networks.'
Thus, the executive branch claimed the power to attack a
sovereign nation solely on the grounds of fear that that nation
might harm the United States in the future.' President Bush
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. J.D.,
Stanford Law School, 1970. The author wishes to thank Pierre Schlag and Mi-
chael Rooke-Ley for their thoughtful suggestions, Ann Scales for her ideas and
encouragement, and extraordinary librarians Kelly Kunsch and Bob
Menanteaux for all of their invaluable help.
1. Richard F. Grimmett, US. Use of Preemptive Military Force: The His-
torical Record, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS
(2002), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-
4grimmett.htm. Mr. Grimmett is a specialist in national defense, foreign af-
fairs, defense, and trade division. Id.
2. See Mike Allen & Karen De Young, Bush: US. Will Strike First at
Enemies; In West Point Speech, President Lays Out Broader US. Policy, WASH.
POST, June 2, 2002, at AO1.
3. See Carla Anne Robbins, How Bush Decided that Iraq's Hussein Must
Be Ousted, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2002, at Al. For a detailed discussion of the
preemptive strategy of the current Bush administration, see NOAM CHOMSKY,
HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL: AMERICA'S QUEST FOR GLOBAL DOMINANCE 1-50
(2003).
4. In fact, the press reported that the current Director of the CIA indicated
in a letter to Congress in early October 2002 that, ironically, only by first engag-
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has demonstrated a willingness to rely upon these unprece-
dented grounds for the use of military force. But does the
Constitution anticipate such a use of military force by the
federal government? Although a significant body of literature
exists regarding the allocation of war power between the
President and Congress, the author could locate nothing that
has been written in case law or legal literature about whether
or not the federal government (i.e., the President and Con-
gress in concert) possesses the constitutional power to wage
preemptive war.
In Section I, this article discusses the difference between
anticipatory self-defense and preemptive war. In Section II,
the article discusses existing jurisprudence concerning the
war power, and finds that none of the doctrine deals with the
specific issue of preemptive war. The article then traces the
five grounds upon which the author maintains that preemp-
tory war is beyond the power of the federal government and
therefore unconstitutional. These grounds include: (1) the so-
cial contract theory of John Locke upon which the legitimacy
of our form of government and the Constitution was based; (2)
the founders' views of war; (3) the founders and the "just war"
doctrine; (4) the risk of permanent alteration of the basic con-
stitutional structure; and (5) America's 214-year history in-
volving the use of military force. In Section III, the article
discusses the political question doctrine, and explores why
prior cases invoking this doctrine to avoid deciding challenges
ing in preemptive war would we risk imminent danger to our soldiers and citi-
zens:
President George Bush's attempt to maintain public support for mili-
tary action against Iraq has taken a fresh blow from an unexpected
quarter, with the publication of a letter from the CIA stating that while
Saddam Hussein poses little threat to America now, a U.S. invasion
could push him into retaliating with chemical or biological weapons.
See Julian Borger, CIA in Blow to Bush Attack Plans, GUARDIAN (London), Oct.
10, 2002, at 1; Robert Collier, Bush 's Evidence of Threat Disputed, Findings Of-
ten Ambiguous, Contradict CIA, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 12, 2002, at A13. On a
global level, preemptive war engendered an analogous risk:
Another well-known specialist warned that the "general strategy of
preemptive war" is likely to provide others with "overwhelming incen-
tives to wield weapons of terror and mass destruction" as a deterrent to
"the unbridled use of American power." Many have noted the likely im-
petus to Iranian nuclear weapons programs. And "there is no question
that the lesson that the North Koreans have learned from Iraq is that
it needs a nuclear deterrent," Selig Harrison commented.
CHOMSKY, supra note 3, at 37-38 (footnote omitted).
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to the use of military force and the war power do not apply to
the issue of preemptory force. The author takes the position
that courts have a legitimate role in reviewing the question of
whether a proposed use of military force against another na-
tion in fact responds to an imminent threat, or is forbidden as
an exercise of preemptive war.' That judicial role, however, is
confined to the evaluation of whether the federal government
has presented sufficient evidence in an in-camera review from
which a reasonable citizen could find an attack to be immi-
nent.6
I. THE SIGNIFICANT LEGAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
ANTICIPATORY (I.E., IMMINENT THREAT) AND PREEMPTIVE
WAR
The Constitution provides the President and Congress
with a number of interrelated enumerated powers which,
when taken together with the "necessary and proper" clause
that empowers the legislative branch, allow the use of mili-
tary force in a wide range of circumstances. Such enumer-
ated powers include making declarations of war, making ap-
propriations, entering into treaties, acting as commander in
chief of the military, and ensuring "faithful execution" of do-
mestic and international law.7 Together, these powers pro-
vide the federal government with flexibility to use force to
protect U.S. citizens, property, allies, territory, and com-
merce, and allow the government to use the military to sup-
port international peacekeeping and/or humanitarian efforts.
By design, the federal government has limited powers.
5. See infra Part VI.
6. See infra Part VI.B.
7. The powers supporting use of military force by the federal government
are distributed throughout Articles I and II of the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 2, 10, 11-16, 18, outlines the following legislative powers: [1] the
power to lay and collect taxes, and provide for the common defense; [2] the
power to borrow money; [10] the power to punish piracy and offenses against
Law of Nations; [11] the power to declare war; [12], [13], and [14] the power to
raise and regulate armies and navies; [15] and [16] the power to create and
regulate a militia; and [18] the power to make all laws "necessary and proper" to
explicit powers. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1, 2 outlines the following executive
powers: [1] commander in chief of military; and [2] the power to enter into trea-
ties with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the power to appoint ambas-
sadors. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 also gives the executive the power to receive am-
bassadors and ministers, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
8. "It must be remembered that the Federal government.., at least the
4992004
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A broad survey of American political-legal developments in
the realm of war leads one to conclude that those powers
should not include the right to use military force in support of
"preemptive war" or "preemptive self-defense,"9 meaning
"us[ing] force to quell any possibility of future attack by an-
other state, even where there is no reason to believe that an
attack is planned and where no prior attack has occurred."' °
There is no question that this nation can act in "anticipa-
tory" self-defense if the threat is truly imminent." Even be-
fore the modern invention of long range missiles and the exis-
tence of terrorist camps, the Caroline Doctrine of 184212
embodied this concept. This doctrine, an agreement between
British and American officials, states that defensive force is
permitted when the "[n]ecessity of that defense is instant,
overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no mo-
ment for deliberation." 3
Modern circumstances admittedly require a bit more
form, was granted neither a general policy power nor the inherent right to act
on any subject matter in order to promote the health safety or welfare of the
people throughout the nation." JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
123 (3d ed. 1986); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
115-16 (1986) (describing how the founders created government of "enumerated
powers"); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 298 (2d ed.
1988) (The "Constitution in granting congressional power simultaneously limits
it.").
9. Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense 2 (Ameri-
can Society of International Law Task Force on Terrorism, ed., 2002) at
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION
AND SELF-DEFENSE 168 (3rd ed. 2001); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275 (1963).
10. O'Connell, supra note 9, at 2 n.10.
11. See, e.g., id. at 8-11.
12. Id. at 9; see also Edward D. Hasbrook, Note, United States Foreign Pol-
icy Through Cloak and Dagger War Operations: Terrorism or Mandate of Na-
tional Security, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 159, 192-93 (1986).
13. John B. Moore, 2 DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 412 (1906). The Caroline case
took place within the context of the Canadian Rebellion of 1837. In spite of a
request by the United States government that its citizens not get involved,
many did, including those bringing arms from New York to the rebels on the
vessel Caroline. The British captured and destroyed the ship; the problem was
that the attack took place in the territorial waters of the United States. Thus,
although the Caroline Doctrine has been used as a general standard for the ap-
propriate use of national self-defense, a recent commentator has suggested that
the doctrine be limited to its original historical context; i.e., "extra-territorial
use of force by a state in peacetime" within the sovereign territory of another
state "which was unable or unwilling to prevent its territory from being used as
a base of operations for hostile activities against the state taking action."
Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 325, 325 (1999).
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flexibility than envisioned in the Caroline Doctrine. Thus,
"anticipatory" self-defense in the modern world would include
attacking the Japanese fleet steaming toward Pearl Harbor in
World War II, provided the United States had clear and con-
vincing evidence of its intent, 4 bombing a terrorist training
camp planning attacks on U.S. citizens or soil, launching of-
fensives after suffering an initial attack and knowing the
imminence of further attacks, and attacking with the knowl-
edge that an enemy is preparing to launch missiles.'
In all these circumstances, the magnitude and certainty
of the risk fit well within the concept of "imminence," as that
concept is conceived in the classic requirement for the use of
deadly force in self-defense." Alternatively, one could desig-
nate the tipping point as the point at which a "clear and pre-
sent danger"' exists that the risk will come to fruition.
Taken from the First Amendment doctrine involving advocacy
of unlawful conduct,'8 this standard seeks to resolve the prob-
lems associated with granting an extremely serious use of
power to the federal government (barring or punishing
speech) in a context where the feared risk has not yet materi-
alized. Likewise, in the present situation in Iraq, the United
States employed an extremely serious use of federal power
(armed military force) in the face of a risk that was only a
possible future risk, and not a current reality.
In contrast, the use of force in preemptive war finds no
justification in notions of "imminence." By definition, war is
preemptory when the situation is neither imminent, nor has
reached the point of constituting a clear and present danger
that the feared harm to national interests will materialize.
Courts should declare the use of preemptory military force
beyond the powers possessed by the federal government un-
der the constitutional framework. Furthermore, as will be
discussed, a claim that the use of military force is preemptive
and therefore unconstitutional does not face the obstacle
which has consistently blocked litigation concerning the use
14. See DINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 17; O' Connell, supra note 9, at 9.
15. O'Connell, supra note 9, at 8-10.
16. Imminent danger is defined as "[t]he danger resulting from an immedi-
ate threatened injury sufficient to cause a reasonable and prudent person to de-
fend himself or herself." THE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW TERMS 320 (Bryan
A. Garner ed., 2000).
17. See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2004
502 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW Vol: 44
of military force: the political question doctrine.19
II. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO CONDUCT PREEMPTIVE WAR OR
PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
One searches in vain to locate a specific case or textual
discussion of the issue of preemptive war and federal power.
In contrast, literature abounds with debates about whether
the President may engage in war unilaterally, or whether
Congress must declare war,2° with the President having only
the power necessary to repel a "sudden attack."'"
Those giving Congress preeminence in war-making em-
phasize the need for broad-based popular discussion and sup-
port for war, given the human and economic burdens war
brings to its citizens and the constitutional mandate that
Congress has the power to declare war.2 Advocates of the po-
sition that the executive branch should have the lead in wag-
ing war look at the law of war as it existed in England prior
to the Revolution,23 and to the over 100 times in our history
19. See discussion infra Part III.B.
20. See generally JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996); Raoul Berger,
War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29 (1972); Henry P. Mona-
ghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 119 (Special Issue 1970); Leo-
nard G. Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking Power-Legislative, Executive
and Judicial Roles, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1971); John C. Yoo, Continuation of
Politics by Other Means: The Onginal Understanding of the War Power, 84
CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996); Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Com-
mit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1968) [hereinafter Combat
Forces].
21. The successful proposal at the Constitutional Convention to change the
word from "make" to "declare" when allocating war power to the Congress has
lead to the conclusion that the founders wanted the President to retain the
power to repel sudden attacks. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 319 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); see generallyRatner, supra note 20, at 467.
22. See ELY, supra note 20, at 3-5; Combat Forces, supra note 20, at 1775.
23. See Yoo, supra note 20, at 167-240. According to Professor Yoo, the
founders adopted the English model, with which they were familiar, in which
the King's power to wage war was balanced by Parliament's control of the purse.
The power to "declare" war placed in the hands of Congress did not alter this
basic "King-Parliament" conception of the President's power to send troops into
battle, since that power was checked by both congressional appropriations and
impeachment powers. According to Yoo, "declaration" was no more than a for-
mal device under international law listing the "crimes" of the enemy (like the
Declaration of Independence) and having the effect of creating legal conse-
quences; e.g., the participants were not insurrectionists or outlaws, the rules of
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that the executive has used troops without congressional con-
sultation.14 In between, some believe that matters involving
the use of military force are issues to be negotiated between
the political branches.25 Still others believe that absent con-
gressional action, the President has free reign in the military
arena, but Congress always may constrain the executive's ac-
tions.26
Though these debates carry great importance, none of
them focus on whether or not the federal government-both
the executive and legislative branches -possesses the power
to engage in preemptive war under the Constitution. Those
few cases reaching the merits of any issue in which the exis-
tence of a state of war is relevant are similarly of no use in
this inquiry.27 They do not deal with the combined power of
prize money applied, etc. Id. at 242-44. But see Combat Forces, supra note 20,
at 1772-73 (indicating that this may have been the original historical
understanding of a "declaration," but contending that the concept has taken on
a less technical and a more functional understanding over time, experience, and
practice).
24. See John C. Yoo, Applying the War Powers Resolution to the War on
Terrorism, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 175, 179 (2003) (stating that troops have been em-
ployed "well over a hundred times in our Nation's history," only a handful with
congressional authorization); see also Yoo, supra note 20, at 177 (indicating "at
least 125 times"); Martin Wald, Note, Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1407, 1414 (1984) (indicating that one author has found 192 in-
stances).
25. See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, What Is It Good For? War Power, Judi-
cial Review, and Constitutional Deliberation, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 685, 691 (2001).
26. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
William P. Agee, Note, The War Powers Resolution: Congress Seeks to Reassert
Its Constitutional Role as a Partner in War Making, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 407
(1987). But see Ronald D. Rotunda, The War Powers Act in Perspective, 2
MICH. L. E. POLy REV. 1, 5 (1997) (stating that vetoes under the War Powers
Resolution are unconstitutional based on the decision in Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha). Chadha held that to the extent a "legislative
veto" of an administrative action conducted pursuant to statutory delegation
can be characterized an "exercise of legislative power" the legislative veto is un-
constitutional, violating the bicameral and/or presentment clause of Art. I § 7.
462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983).
27. See The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635 (1863) (addressing the issue of
whether ships seized in a blockade ordered by President Lincoln in the face of
southern insurrection were subject to be taken as prizes under the law of war,
and holding that a formal declaration of war by Congress was not a necessary
predicate for implementation of prizes rules); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170
(1804) (addressing the issue of the percentage of value of a ship and cargo,
seized by American commander during naval operations against the French,
that would flow to the commander versus the ship's owner, and rejecting the
owner's claim that prize rules should not operate when there was no formal dec-
laration of war by Congress); see also Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801); Bas v.
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the political branches of government to use military force;
rather, they involve statutory and admiralty law regarding
taking and/or selling "prize" ships and their goods.28
The lack of direct textual or case material, however, does
not deny a court the ability to decide this issue. Under ac-
cepted principles of evidence and proof, circumstantial evi-
dence has equal force to direct evidence."9 It is the position of
the author that the weight of circumstantial evidence legiti-
mates the claim that the federal government does not have
the power under the Constitution to commit military force to
preemptive war. The circumstantial evidence falls into five
categories: (1) the philosophical underpinnings of the Consti-
tution's legitimacy, i.e., John Locke's social contract theory;
(2) the founders and the "just war" doctrine; (3) the founders'
perspective on war; (4) the possible permanent effect on the
constitutional structure in permitting preemptive war; and
(5) the 214 years of experience of the U.S. in employing mili-
tary force. Each of these categories will now be discussed in
sequence.
A. Preemptive War or Preemptive Self-Defense Is at Odds
with the Rationale Underlying the Social Contract Theory
"We the people, in order to form a more perfect union..
is a direct expression of the political theory provided in the
Social Contract of John Locke. 30 Although the social contract
theory had appeared in writings on political philosophy for
over a hundred years before the formation of this nation, only
the United States took to heart Locke's theory to structure its
government."
Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
28. See supra note 27.
29. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 132 (2003) ("Direct
evidence is not necessarily better than circumstantial evidence."); 9TH CIR. JURY
INSTR. 3.1, Instruction 1.6 (2001) ("The law makes no distinction between the
weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence.").
30. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson,
ed., 1980).
31. Donald L. Doernberg, "We The People:" John Locke, Collective Constitu-
tional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV.
52, 52-68 (1985); James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections.: Imple-
menting Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L.
REV. 189 (1990). In fairness, it should be noted that some of the founders es-
poused the addition of the philosophy of Civic Republicanism (civic virtue) to
Locke's Social Contract in order to mitigate what they believed was the exces-
504 Vol: 44
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The social contract theory postulated that back in the
mists of time man lived in a state of nature where it was
every man for himself, "all against all. 32 In this world, each
individual had "natural rights" revealed by their God-given
ability to reason." But each man was his own law with re-
spect to asserting and protecting these rights, with force be-
ing the final arbiter.' In other words, man possessed a great
deal of freedom, but not much security.
To gain security for their lives and property, people were
willing to leave the state of nature, and with it, their previ-
ously unappealable right to be the ultimate law.35 Thus, one
gave up the right to make the rules for day-to-day life, leaving
that to a representative body which itself was subject to law.36
The law, not individual will, then ultimately decided all dis-
putes.
These Lockean natural law notions guided the construc-
tion of the Constitution and the United States government, 7
and even played an explicit part in early Supreme Court deci-
sions.38 Early Supreme Court Justices were present at the
creation of the United States and knew that they had em-
barked upon a great and new political experiment in govern-
ment. It was a nation built on the radical theories of a six-
teenth-century English philosopher. This idea has become
lost in time, and scholars tend to think of only the trees of the
constitutional text and not the forest of political philosophy.
Yet the theory of social contract forms the very basis, and le-
gitimacy, of American government. The framers of the Con-
stitution did not base the government on conquest or the di-
sive individualism of Locke's theory. See, e.g., THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT
OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM-THE MORAL VISIONS OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE (1988).
32. See LOCKE, supra note 30, at xiii-xvi (discussing Locke's view of the
"state of nature").
33. Id. at 9; Thomas L. Pangle, The Philosophic Understandings of Human
Nature Informing the Constitution, in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION 9
(Alan Bloom ed., 1990) [hereinafter CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION].
34. LOCKE, supra note 30, at 11-12; Frank D. Balog, The Scottish Enlight-
enment and the Liberal Political Tradition, in CONFRONTING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 33, at 202.
35. See LOCKE, supra note 30, at Editor's Introduction.
36. Id. at 16, 53, 66, 70-71, 111; Gardner, supra note 31, at 202.
37. See supra note 29.
38. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43 (1815); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S.
87 (1810); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
2004 505
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vine right of kings. They based it on the belief that the citi-
zenry had entered into a contract.
Because foreign powers can threaten each citizen's secu-
rity, the Constitution upholds the federal government's side
of the Lockean bargain 9 by promising to "provide for the
common defence." 4' Reviewing the philosophical roots of that
bargain, however, one would unlikely construe the "common
defense" to include any notion of "preemptive" defense.
Under the social contract theory, people trade the right to
be their own law in return for the assurance that the govern-
ment will protect them from the ultimate risk of a fatal attack
in the state of nature.41 It would be anomalous if the foun-
ders, who had adopted the social contract theory as the basis
for their government's legitimacy, would arrogate to that
same government the right to attack others outside its bor-
ders when not directly threatened. The only enemies the
founders may have envisioned were likely the European
countries of the colonists' ancestry and heritage. It is difficult
to imagine that the founders of this fledgling nation could
conceptualize such old and culturally rich countries as Eng-
land, France, and Spain as suddenly living in, and subject to
the rules of, the state of nature. It is not surprising, therefore,
that military force under the constitutional structure should
have been conceived as defensive in nature.
As such, the power provided for the "common defense" in-
cluded within the legislative power in the Constitution42 was
envisioned to be necessary to repel "external attacks" (i.e.,
self-defense)." Of course, the founders had an ocean between
themselves and their European enemies. They could hardly
imagine an object that could be launched across that ocean
and land with such explosive force that the object could oblit-
erate any city existing in their world. Likely, they never
39. "Security against foreign danger" was "an avowed and essential object of
the American Union." THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 304 (James Madison) (Jacob
E. Cook ed., 1982).
40. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
41. Locke saw this as a risk that "each was 'constantly exposed to the inva-
sion of others,' his life and property 'very unsafe, very insecure', and his exis-
tence 'full of fears and continual dangers'." LOCKE, supra note 30, at xiv.
42. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
43. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The principle pur-
poses to be answered by Union are these-The common defence of the members
- the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as ex-
ternal attack....").
506 Vol: 44
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imagined structures the size of a hundred houses stacked on
top of one another and a flying object crashing into the struc-
ture, exploding and destroying the entire edifice. But, while
the invention of weapons of mass destruction changes the fac-
tual understanding of what threats can now be "imminent,"
an "imminent" threat is still the standard for the constitu-
tional exercise of the power to use military force.
B. Preemptive War or Preemptive Self-Defense Would Be
Antithetical to the Framers'Notion of a "Just War"
The founders' Christian beliefs were inextricably tied into
the social contract theory. The limited government conceived
at the Constitutional Convention was in part limited because
of the belief in the existence of "inalienable rights," such as
those at the center of the Declaration of Independence, which
could neither be ceded to nor taken by the federal govern-
ment.' These rights were "natural law" rights45 manifested
through God-given reason,46 inherent in God's creation of
man.
As persons whose Lockean political philosophy and
Christian religious conceptions were intellectually inter-
twined,47 the founders' view of war would have been circum-
scribed by the "just war" doctrine. The "just war" doctrine
provides norms and criteria for assessing whether a govern-
ment's resort to force is morally justified. The doctrine pro-
44. See David L. Wardle, Reason to Ratify: The Influence of John Locke's
Religious Beliefs on the Creation and Adoption of the United States Constitu-
tion, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 291, 304-05 (2002).
45. Id.; TRIBE, supra note 8, at 560-61.
46. See Wardle, supra note 44, at 307-08.
47. See generally id. at 292 ("The pervasive influence of Lockean religious
convictions motivated the framers of the Constitution to establish a new form of
government, provided the theoretical basis for the document itself, and inspired
its popular ratification"); see also id. at 308:
Sharing Locke's belief that the government of men should model God's
plan for their salvation, the convention determined to create a govern-
ment by social contract. Because they believed that God would inspire
men through the gift of reason, they exercised faith and surrendered
the Constitution to the American people for their ratification.
Id.
48. For a general overview of the concept of just war, see "War, Morality of,
in 14 THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 635 (R.A. McCormick & D.
Christiansen eds., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA].
See also RONALD G. MUSTO, THE CATHOLIC PEACE TRADITION (1988).
49. See NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 48, at 635.
2004
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vides both criteria for judging whether resort to force is justi-
fied (ius ad bellum) and criteria regarding the conduct of war
once combat has commenced (ius in hello). The ius ad he]-
lum contains six criteria: (1) just cause, (2) competent author-
ity, (3) right intention, (4) last resort, (5) probability of suc-
cess, and (6) proportionality.5' One could hardly imagine how
a truly preemptive war could ever meet these six criteria.
Admittedly, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
have seen conflicts break out in permutations different than a
war begun by some aggressor nation, such as Germany in
WWII. Adding to the type of traditional war, such as the one
the federal government has conducted against Iraq, the world
is now plagued with guerilla warfare, terrorism and counter-
terrorism, and ethnic cleansing. Yet, none of these develop-
ments change the basic just war doctrine. "Just cause" still
means that the "war is permissible only to confront 'a real na-
tional and certain danger' ... . By definition, this principle
cannot encompass preemptive war.
Not surprisingly, given this definition of "just cause," as
well as the requirement of "last resort," the United Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops in its Statement on Iraq plainly indi-
cated that war against Iraq would not be a "just" one. 3 In
fact, in addition to the "just cause" and "last resort" criteria,
the Bishops also questioned both the criteria for "competent
authority" (questioning the U.S. taking such action other
than as part of a UN initiative) and "proportionality" (citing
the current suffering of the Iraqi people under the sanctions,
and the likely further suffering in the event of war). 4
50. Id. at 637.
51. Id.
52. Summary of a pastoral letter on war and peace by the National Confer-
ence of Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response (May
3, 1983), at http://www.zero-nukes.org/challengeofpeace.pdf.
53. See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Statement on Iraq,
(Nov. 13, 2002), at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/iraq.htm; Bishop Wilton D.
Gregory, Letter to President Bush on Iraq, (Sept. 13, 2002), at
http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/international/bush902.htm.
54. Id; see also Center for Constitutional Rights, Consequences of Future
Force Against Iraq (Jan. 24, 2002), at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/newsroom/docs/letterIto-georgebush.pdf (addressing President Bush
and Secretary of State Rumsfeld, detailing humanitarian harm of Iraqi war on
civilian population).
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C. Preemptive War Is Inconsistent with the Founders'
Perspective on War
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the foun-
ders had just endured a bloody war on their soil and had no
interest in granting the federal government the power to eas-
ily wage the country in war.55 Thus, at the Pennsylvania rati-
fying conference, James Wilson spoke of the Constitution and
war: "The system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to
guard against it." 6 Wars were matters of necessity; some-
thing to be avoided if possible. With this perspective, it is
hard to imagine that the founders would have given the fed-
eral government the power to make war on the grounds other
than true "imminent" danger; i.e., traditional self-defense.
Americans did not seek empire and conquest. They had
been subject to colonization and were not at heart colonialists
to the extent of the European powers. They had gone into
battle under a banner displaying a coiled rattlesnake ready to
strike, under which was written, "don't tread on me.,,57 This
symbol appears to convey a sentiment about what those fight-
ing for the would-be nation thought about military force: do
not bother us, we will not bother you; strike us and you will
suffer.
The young nation was so cautious about extending the
war power beyond repelling an attack within its borders that
during the War of 1812, there were serious questions within
the federal government whether it had the power to cross the
55. See Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President, and the Power to
Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 132-33 (1971) (indicating that the foun-
ders wanted to make it difficult to engage in real war); see also Ely, supra note
20; Yoo, supra note 20. Although Professors Ely and Yoo hold diametrically op-
posed views on the locus of power to initiate war under our Constitution (Ely
placing it in the Congress; Yoo in the President), both agree that one purpose of
the founders' chosen structure was to make the initiation of war difficult. See
supra note 20. Ely is concerned with a war initiated without the type of wide-
spread political debate and support engendered by the legislative process. Ely,
supra note 20, at 3-5. Yoo cites concerns of the founders that, "Classical history
displayed wild tendencies by pure democracies toward war" and that the popu-
lar will might be "consumed with private interests" in seeking war. Yoo, supra
note 20, at 302. Yoo contends that the founders lessened those concerns by
placing substantial control over the war power by the executive. See id. at 302.
56. Yoo, supra note 20, at 190.
57. This phrase appeared on the first American flag, raised by Lt. John Paul
Jones in Commodore Esek Hopkin's flagship, the Alfred, on December 3, 1775.
See John Ferri, O&A, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Mar. 16, 1997, at Nation/World 13.
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border into Canada as part of its nation's defense.58 The ques-
tion was eventually answered in the affirmative, and the U.S.
attacked Canada.59 But the fact that some in government se-
riously debated over what today we would find obvious gives
insight into how strongly those in the new nation perceived
the use of military force as tied to true self-defense.
As Constitutional Convention delegate Oliver Ellsworth
of Connecticut said, "there is material difference between the
cases of making war and making peace. It shd. [sic] be more
easy to get out of war, than into it."60 Supporting Ellsworth,
George Mason of Virginia added that he "was for clogging
rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace."'"
58. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS--THE ORIGINS 268 (1984).
59. Id.
60. Yoo, supra note 20, at 263.
61. Id. In fact, the new nation possessed neither economic nor military re-
sources to wage war (at the time Washington assumed the presidency, there
were fewer than 840 men in the U.S. Army, and there were no naval forces to
command). See Jules Lobel, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution: The Trans-
formation of the Original Understanding, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 273, 274-75 (David Kairys, ed., 2d ed. 1990). As Attor-
ney General Randolph wrote to James Monroe in 1775:
An infant country, deep in debt; necessitated to borrow in Europe;
without manufacture; without a land or naval force; without a compe-
tency of arms or ammunition; with a commerce, closely connected be-
yond the Atlantic, with a certainty of enhancing the price of foreign
productions, and diminishing that of our own; with a constitution more
than four years old; in a state of probation, and not exempt from foes[-
]such a country can have no greater curse in store for her than war.
That peace was our policy has been admitted by Congress, and France
by herself.
Letter from Randolph to James Monroe of June 1, 1775, in Jules Lobel, The Rise
and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers
in United States Foreign Policy, HARV, INT'L L.J. 1, 21 (1983). Lobel has also
noted:
Foreign policy was a major concern underlying the convocation of the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Various state governments
were violating international law and treaty agreements, provoking re-
taliatory actions by European powers. Randolph opened the main
business of the convention by listing the defects of the Articles of Con-
federation, the first of which included "that they could not cause infrac-
tions to treaties or of the law of nations to be punished." Madison ech-
oed this theme, asking whether the proposed constitutional plan will
"prevent those violations of the law of nations and treaties which if not
prevented must involve us in the calamities of war."
Jules Lobel, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution: The Transformation of the
Original Understanding, in THE POLITICS OF LAW-A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
275 (David Kairys ed. 1982).
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Moreover, a significant percentage of the citizenry at that
time would not have wanted to give the federal government
any more excuse to raise an army than necessary. Regarding
war powers, the greatest fear of the anti-federalist was that
the President, in alliance with or unopposed by Congress,
would use a standing army to create a federal dictatorship."
Allowing preemptive war would have given the executive a
rationale for constantly maintaining an army. The new
American citizens had just fought and died to expel just such
a government in the form of the Crown and its troops. They
were not about to fall under the heels of the same form of
government, with the title "President" substituted for "King."
D. Permitting Preemptive War Risks Permanent Alteration
of the Basic Constitutional Structure
It seems a fair proposition to contend that the federal
government faces the limits of its powers when its actions
threaten a permanent alteration of the basic constitutional
structure."3 Thus, recent Tenth Amendment Supreme Court
jurisprudence retains sensitivity to the concern that excessive
federal encroachment into matters affecting the states risks
erosion of state sovereignty, and with it, the basic federalist
constitutional structure.64 In effect, these cases found that an
enumerated power given to the federal government to benefit
the federal-republic (i.e., the Commerce Clause) could not
constitutionally be employed in a manner actually tending to
erode that same federal-republic (i.e., weaken the federal-
state relationship embodied in the concept of federalism).
The same concern inures in the misuse of federal military
power. At the extreme, the federal government cannot consti-
tutionally exercise its power to use military force if that force
is employed to seize control of all state governments in order
to impose a federal dictatorship. Although permitting pre-
emptory war does not raise this extreme scenario, it risks se-
riously undermining the constitutional structure, a risk at
62. Yoo, supra note 20, at 272-73.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that
the Violence Against Women Act exceeded congressional power under the
Commerce Clause); Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a
congressional act barring possession of firearms in "school zones" is beyond the
power of Congress).
64. See cases cited supra note 63.
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least as great as that posed by any foreseeable misuse of the
Commerce Clause.
The following scenario illustrates how this harm to the
constitutional structure could emerge. Claiming the right to
conduct preemptive war, the federal government carries out a
series of seemingly unending military actions from Afghani-
stan to Iraq, Iraq to Syria, Syria to Iran, Iran to Somalia,
Somalia to North Korea, North Korea to [Fill in the blank].
Once preemptive self-defense is accepted as legitimate, what
previously may have been unthinkable65 becomes relatively
simple,66 especially with a compliant visual media which
seems to find "war as a sporting event," or "war as a video
game," good for ratings.
The foundations of preemptive war make such behavior
possible. Relying upon the rationale of preemptive self-
defense, particularly when conjoined with the recent belief in
state-sponsored terrorism, the United States can justify at-
tacking any other nation. In this post-9/11 world, many peo-
ple believe that a handful of terrorists armed with so-called
weapons of mass destruction could cause significant harm
and inflict large-scale casualties on an otherwise powerful
country." Therefore, for example, employing the preemptive
defense rationale, Russia could justify attacking a tiny, pow-
erless nation on the claim that a small group of residents of
that state were likely some day to provide a few vials of some
deadly virus to the Chechnyan rebels.
Imagine the scenario has proceeded to a point where the
U.S. is embroiled in a series of wars. In this constant state of
65. But see Billy Bragg, North Sea Bubble, in No Pop, No STYLE, STRICTLY
ROOTS (1979) (asking, in this musical recording, "War - What is it good for? It's
good for business."), available at
http://www.billybragg.co.uk/releases/albums/dont-try-this/dontl3.html.
66.
Virtually any country has the potential and ability to produce WMD,
and intent is in the eye of the beholder. Hence the refined version of the
grand strategy effectively grants Washington the right of arbitrary ag-
gression. Lowering the bar for the resort to force is the most significant
consequence of the collapse of the proclaimed argument for the inva-
sion.
CHOMSKY, supra note 3, at 14.
67. See, e.g., Steve Shultze & Meg Jones, Many Americans Fear Another
Terror Attack, Poll Finds, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 5, 2003, at 1A (stat-
ing that three-fourths of the people polled expected occasional ongoing terrorist
attacks, with 58% fearing attacks might come soon).
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war, society's almost exclusive focus becomes the current war.
Federal funds and priorities become focused on all things
military. But, because any attack on a nation in the twenty-
first century carries the threat of terrorist reprisals, states
must enlist in providing anti-terrorism security. This, how-
ever, will tend to drain state coffers, leaving insufficient fund-
ing for such traditional state functions as education and
crime control. At the same time, the constant danger of en-
emy attack can be used to justify broad security-directed leg-
islation like the Patriot Act,6" increased pressure on civil lib-
erties, 9 and an ever-mounting presence of the federal
government in the private lives of citizens. The result is a
dominating federal government in which the states and the
citizens principally exist to endlessly support the federal mili-
tary-industrial complex, preemptive war to preemptive war.
Under these circumstances, the federalist conception reflected
in the constitutional structure of American government would
exist only in the most diluted form, as that structure under-
goes de facto alteration.
E. Prior to Our Attack on Iraq, the United States Never
Engaged in Preemptive War
The United States has sent troops into other sovereign
nations "well over a hundred times."":  Admittedly, history
suggests that some of the official rationales were perhaps in-
genuous, with the military action at least in part being moti-
vated by, for example, a desire to annex land on the North
68. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
69. Recent experience has unfortunately made this risk palpable. See, e.g.,
LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: How
CHANGES TO U.S. LAW AND POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES (2003) (update to LAWYERS COMMITTEE, A YEAR FOR LOSS: RE-
EXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11) (discussing widespread post-
9/11 enhancement of governmental powers to spy on U.S. citizens and to gather
information about U.S. citizens; legislation limiting citizens' access to informa-
tion about the federal government; indefinite incarceration of U.S. citizens; ex-
panded power to search libraries, bookstores, and the Internet; proposals that
would permit extradition of U.S. citizens for trial in foreign countries with
which we have no extradition treaties; proposals that would permit loss of U.S.
citizenship as punishment for certain acts; and lessening constraints on foreign
intelligence services to conduct domestic surveillance).
70. Yoo, supra note 24, at 179.
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American continent.7 1  Yet, even these actions never
amounted to anything akin to preemptive self-defense: "The
historical record indicates that the United States has never,
to date, engaged in a 'preemptive' military attack against an-
other nation."72
Throughout its over 200-year history, the United States
has used a variety of rationales to justify use of force. Some
rationales have involved the use of force to protect U.S. citi-
zens and property.73 Others involved circumstances where
the local governments allegedly could no longer maintain or-
der,74 including situations where treaty rights75 supplemented
this nation's right to intervene. The United States has even
employed troops in a failed attempt to rescue American citi-
zens held hostage."
Some incursions were based on the Monroe Doctrine:
71. The incursions into Spanish-controlled Florida in the early 1800s and
the Mexican War in 1846 smack of the aggrandizement of territory, yet neither
action was based on any claim of a right to conduct a preemptive war. The ra-
tionale underlying our military aggression into Florida was comprised of a com-
bination of factors, including instability in a territory we were in the process of
negotiating to purchase, the request of a revolutionary government for our aid,
the reality that otherwise British troops would be stationed at the Southern bor-
der of the new nation, and filling the vacuum resulting from the collapse of the
Spanish Empire. See SOFAER, supra note 58, at 294-326. The Mexican War in-
volved our claim of a lawful right to disputed territory that now constitutes
much of Texas. President Polk sent troops to claim all land north of the Rio
Grande, and when the Mexican government understandably objected and
crossed the Rio Grande, America considered itself "attacked on its soil," and
thus responded in self-defense of its territory and people. See Grimmett, supra
note 1; Ratner, supra note 20, at 467-68; Combat Forces, supra note 20, at 1780.
72. Grimmett, supra note 1.
73. Troops have been deployed to protect citizens in Haiti (intermittently:
1915-1934); Dominican Republic (intermittently: 1916-1924, 1965); the Chinese
Boxer Rebellion (1900) (though in the process international laws were violated
by taking reprisals against the rebels); Nicaragua (1912); Panama (1903, 1989);
Grenada (1983) (acting upon the request of neighboring islands when a Marxist
faction overthrew the existing government); Formosa (1955); and Lebanon
(1957). See generally Ratner, supra note 20, at 468-70; Combat Forces, supra
note 20, at 1788-93.
74. Supra note 71.
75. Intrusions into Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the early portion of
the twentieth century were in part justified by treaties that in effect made those
nations U.S. protectorates. Grimett, supra note 1, at CRS-3. Treaties involving
Panama and the Canal were used as part of the justification for our interven-
tion in 1903. Id. at CRS-3. Similarly, President Eisenhower's decision to send
marines to the Dominican Republic in 1965 was based on O.A.S. obligations.
See Grimmett, supra note 1; Combat Forces, supra note 20, at 1792-93.
76. See Yoo, supra note 20, at 8 (discussing deployment of troops in an ulti-
mately unsuccessful attempt to rescue Iranian hostages in 1980).
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sending troops to states whose instability made them incapa-
ble of keeping "foreign powers" out of the Western Hemi-
sphere.77 Force has also been used to respond to a foreign
state that sponsored terrorism that resulted in the death of
American citizens in Europe. 78
Military force has been employed to restore governments
to power in the Western Hemisphere," and at other times has
been used in conjunction with a treaty obligation to ensure
the "neutrality" of the Isthmus of Panama. ° The United
States has also used troops to preserve the status quo while
negotiating for the annex of foreign-held territory in North
America,"' and has dispatched troops to pursue pirates, ban-
dits, and outlaws."
The United States has protected its military personnel,
such as in the Puebk!3 and MayaqueY4 incidents, and has
acted when its troops have been fired upon when providing
military aid to neighboring nations. 5 Furthermore, the
United States has fought wars against nations that preyed on
its shipping and commerce; 6 nations that invaded "disputed
territory" the U.S. claimed to have annexed; a nation that at-
tacked U.S. Naval bases (Pearl Harbor); a nation intertwined
with terrorists who attacked U.S. soil (9/11); and a nation
which refused to leave its Caribbean colony, declared war
against the U.S., and arguably sank a U.S. battle ship ("Re-
77. See SOFAER, supra note 58, at 255; see also Grimmett supra, note 1.
78. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 99; Honorable Robert G. Torricelli, War
Powers Resolution After the Libya Crisis, 7 PACE L. REV. 661, 666 (1987).
79. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 101 (discussing deployment of troops to
Haiti in 1994).
80. See Combat Forces, supra note 20, at 1789 (discussing intervention in
Panama against Columbia in 1903 based on 1846 treaty).
81. See supra note 69 (discussing intrusions into Spanish-held Florida).
82. We have chased Pancho Villa into Mexico, the Seminoles into Florida,
and Noriega into Panama. See Berger, supra note 20, at 59-60; Combat Forces,
supra note 20, at 1789.
83. See Combat Forces, supra note 20, at 1781 (discussing the military re-
sponse to the North Korean attack on a U.S. naval ship, the Pueblo).
84. See Yoo, supra note 20, at 181 (discussing the military response to
Cambodian attack on Mayaquez in 1975).
85. Wald, supra note 24, at 1422 (stating that troops providing military aid
at the request of El Salvador were fired upon in 1984).
86. Examples of wars based on shipping and commerce include the wars
against the Tripoli Pirates (1802), Algiers (1815), undeclared war against
France (Adam's War, 1798-1800), the War of 1812, and World War 1 (1914). See
Ratner, supra note 20, at 465-66; Combat Forces, supra note 20, at 1785-86.
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member the Maine").87
Most of America's use of force in the latter twentieth cen-
tury, however, has been pursuant to some combination of re-
gional and bilateral defense pacts (NATO, SEATO), treaty ob-
ligations, and UN membership.88 In addition to justifying
force against aggressors, these commitments also have pro-
vided the basis for providing troops for peacekeeping and
humanitarian purposes."
Only the Cuban Missile Crisis of 19620 even hinted at
the use of preemptive force. Yet, that incident hardly stands
as a precedent. First, reasonable people could have charac-
terized the risk to U.S. citizens and soil as "imminent." The
"Evil Empire,""0 whose leader made threats against American
interests by claiming that "we will bury you," 2 surreptitiously
brought nuclear missiles to an island ally, located a boat ride
87. The Spanish-American War is somewhat complex in its origins. Shortly
prior to a U.S. declaration of war, Congress had passed an act (1) declaring
Cuba independent of Spain, (2) demanding that Spain withdraw its troops from
Cuba, and (3) authorizing the President to use military force to achieve those
ends. Spain rejected the demands, and declarations of war by both nations fol-
lowed. When the battleship Maine blew up and sunk in Manila Harbor, Amer-
ica proceeded to attack the Spanish held territories of Cuba and the Philippines.
See Grimmett, supra note 1, at CRS-3; Ratner, supra note 20, at 470.
88. The Korean War (1950) was justified by our commitments to the UN
charter; Viet Nam was justified by the SEATO mutual defense pact and the
1954 Geneva Accord which divided North and South Korea; and the 1991 Iraqi
War by a UN resolution following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. See U.S. Dept. of
State Office of the Legal Advisor, The Legality of United States Participation in
Viet Nam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085 (1966); Combat Forces, supra note 20, at 1791-92;
Jane E. Stromseth, Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War
Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 50 MIAMI L. REV. 145 (1995). This has
prompted some authors to question whether UN resolutions and treaties can
supplant Congress's role in declaring war, and whether treaties can trump con-
stitutional protections. See Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the
Power to Declare War.: A Requiem to Viet Nam, 121 U. PAL. REV. 1, 15 (1972);
Bishop, Jr., Unconstitutional Theaties, 42 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1958).
89. Supra note 86. Sending troops into Lebanon (1982) (secular violence
continues after Israeli invasion), Kosovo (1984), and Somalia (1993), all were
part of UN or NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.
90. See Grimmett, supra note 1; Yoo, supra note 24, at 179.
91. The Soviet Union was referred to as the "Evil Empire" by American poli-
ticians throughout the Cold War. See, e.g., Regan Stresses Morality, Other
Conservative Themes; Calls USSR. "Evil Empire," 1983 FACTS ON FILE
WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Mar. 11, 1983, at A3.
92. In 1956, during a meeting of the UN Assembly, Soviet President Nikita
Kruschev banged his shoe on his desk and shouted "we will bury you" to the
U.S. Representative. Nyta Mann, When the Diplomatic Mask Slips, BBC NEWS
WORLD EDITION, Oct. 28, 2002.
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from U.S. shore.93 Advisors from that "cold war" enemy na-
tion were helping set up and man the missile batteries, and
these missiles would soon be, if not already, targeting the
United States.94 Second, and most importantly, the U.S. did
not attack Cuba. The combination of a naval blockade and
tense negotiations led to removal of the missiles.95
It is far more than mere coincidence that in 214 years of
its history, the United States has never attempted to rational-
ize its use of force under the label of "preemptive" defense.
Arguably, such a rationale would violate international law.
91
In any event, the notion of attempting to justify the rationale
of preemptive war should strike one as deeply terrifying if one
takes but a moment to think of its implications for any possi-
bility of a world at peace:
If America creates a precedent through its practice, that
93. Abram Chayes, Living History Interview-Symposium: Nuclear Weap-
ons, the World Court, and Global Security, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
459, 461 (1997).
94. Id.
95. See ROBERT SMITH THOMPSON, THE MISSILES OF OCTOBER: THE
DECLASSIFIED STORY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
(1992).
96. O'Connell, supra note 9, at 2-3, 21; see also JENNIE GREEN ET AL.,
AGAINST WAR WITH IRAQ: AN ANTI-WAR PRIMER (2003); Richard Falk, Why In-
ternational Law Matters: Pre-emptive War Flagrantly Contradicts the UN's Le-
gal Framework, 9 THE NATION 276 (Mar. 10, 2003). See also CHOMSKY, supra
note 3, at 12-13:
Preventive war [i.e., preemptive war] falls within the category of war
crimes. If indeed it is an idea "whose time has come," then the world is
in deep trouble. As the invasion of Iraq began, the prominent historian
and Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger wrote that:
The President has adopted a policy of "anticipatory self-defense"
that is alarmingly similar to the policy that imperial Japan em-
ployed at Pearl Harbor, on a date which, as an earlier American
president said it would, lives in infamy. Franklin D. Roosevelt was
right, but today it is we Americans who live in infamy.
He added that:
"[T]he global wave of sympathy that engulfed the United States af-
ter 9-11 has given way to a global wave of hatred of American ar-
rogance and militarism," and even in friendly countries the public
regards Bush "as a greater threat to peace than Saddam Hussein."
International law specialist Richard Falk finds it "inescapable"
that that Iraq war was a "Crime against Peace of the sort for which
surviving German leaders were indicted, prosecuted, and punished
at the Nuremberg trials."
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see Jason Burke & Ed Vulliamy; Crisis in the Mid-
dle East: Iraq Waits for War as Hawks Lay Their Plans, OBSERVER, July 14,
2002, at 14.
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precedent will be available, like a loaded gun, for other
states to use as well. The preemptive use of military force
would establish a precedent that the United States has
worked against since 1945. Preemptive self-defense would
provide legal justification for Pakistan to attack India, for
Iran to attack Iraq, for Russia to attack Georgia, for Azer-
baijan to attack Armenia, for North Korea to attack South
Korea, and so on. Any state that believes another regime
poses a possible future threat-regardless of the evi-
dence-could cite the United States invasion of Iraq.97
Fairly, one could infer that our founders were far too
bright to place the United States at such risk.
III. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION DENIES THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT THE POWER TO EMPLOY PREEMPTIVE MILITARY
FORCE IS JUSTICIABLE
A. The Issue of the Limits of the Federal Government to
Employ Military Force Is a Legal One
Preemptive war presents the courts with an issue
squarely within the province of the judicial branch of gov-
ernment: Given the constitutional framework in which the
federal government is one of limited, enumerated powers, " is
the power to use force in a preemptive war one which the fed-
eral government has been given? This issue is no different
than issues involving the limits of federal power to act under
the Commerce Clause when those actions interfere with the
affairs of the states under the system of federalism.9
As historically espoused in Marbury v. Madison:'00 "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."'' Therefore, as discussed next, the
political question doctrine of Baker v. Car?2 has no applica-
tion to this issue.
97. O'Connell, supra note 9, at 19.
98. See supra, note 8.
99. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
100. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
101. Id. at 177.
102. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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B. The Political Question Doctrine Has No Application to
This Case
1. The Traditional Rationales for Applying the
Political Question Doctrine to Suits Challenging
Presidential Resort to Military Force Have No
Bearing
Courts tend to associate the political question doctrine
with any litigation attempting to enjoin the use of military
force. °3 The following arguments supporting resort to the po-
litical question doctrine by now are familiar. The Constitu-
tion has a textual commitment to the two political branches of
government. " Congress and the executive branch need to
negotiate how they will handle events of military force or war,
without interference from the courts."' Moreover, the rela-
tionship between war, foreign affairs, and political negotia-
tions are complex, nuanced, and beyond the understanding of
the judiciary whose uninformed interference could jeopardize
national interests.0 6 Courts also lack the competence, infor-
mation-gathering capacity, or meaningful standards to assess
103. See, e.g, Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1973); Lowry v. Regan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C.
1987); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C 1970). But see Mora v. McNa-
mara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Stewart & Douglass, JJ., dissenting) (denying certio-
rari in a case addressing the constitutionality of Viet Nam War). On the other
hand, some courts have found the issue of declaring war justiciable under the
political question doctrine, but denied cases on other grounds. See, e.g., Or-
lando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding evidence of "suffi-
cient action" by Congress to authorize war); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
1141, 1150-51 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that a case asking the Court to find the
1991 Iraqi war unconstitutional because Congress did not declare war was jus-
ticiable under the political question doctrine, but was not "ripe").
In fact, the current Supreme Court may be more willing to look at the
exercise of war powers. While the Court's grant of certiorari in the Guan-
tanamo detention cases, A] Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d. 1134 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 534 (2003), was delineated as being done only to decide
upon the federal court's jurisdiction over the matter, the Court's action can be
perceived as "[s]etting the stage for a historical clash between the presidential
and judicial authority in a time of military conflict . ... " Linda Greenhouse,
Justices to Hear Case of Detainees at Guantanamo-A Jurisdiction Question,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at Al.
104. See Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Broughton,
supra note 25, at 691.
105. See Broughton, supra note 25, at 691.
106. See Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043 ("It [inappropriate judicial inquiry]
would, indeed, destroy the flexibility of action which the executive and legisla-
tive branches must have in dealing with other sovereigns.").
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such basically political issues,"7 such as whether the Presi-
dent's dispatch of troops constitutes "hostilities" under the
War Powers Resolution.' Furthermore, Congress can resort
to "self-help" to check presidential powers. Finally, the
founders considered disputes between the President and Con-
gress as not constituting "cases [or] controversies.""0
Although some have forcefully argued that issues involv-
ing commitment of U.S. troops can and must be considered by
the courts," ' these arguments need not be considered here.
None of the rationales for which courts have employed the po-
litical question doctrine to abstain from deciding the merits of
questions concerning whether Congress or the President may
declare war have any application to the current question of
whether the Constitution permits the federal government to
conduct a preemptory war at all.
When considering preemptory war, none of the previous
concerns underlying resort to the political question doctrine
matter. Whether the President or Congress has initiated this
action bears no importance."' The meaning of "declare" war
107. See Broughton, supra note 25, at 691.
108. See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898-99 (D.D.C. 1982); see also
Ratner, supra note 20, at 482.
109. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000). Justice Silberman also wrote
that no principled judicial standards exist for defining "war" for purposes of
constitutional interpretation. Id. at 24-25. Even if Justice Silberman is correct,
his analysis would have no bearing on the present case. See id. at 40 (Tatel, J.,
dissenting). It does not matter whether one terms a preemptive "war" a pre-
emptive "attack," preemptive "use of significant military force," preemptive
"self-defense," preemptive "attack on another nation to prevent it from attack-
ing us in the future," or such. Whatever label one puts on the use of preemptive
military force such as directed against Iraq, that particular use of force is con-
stitutionally beyond the power possessed by the federal government. See dis-
cussion infra Part III.B.1.
110. See Yoo, supra note 20, at 288 (indicating that the founders did not con-
sider disputes between legislative and executive branches "cases or controver-
sies"). But see Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating
that the court may be willing to consider a dispute between Congress and the
President in principle, but finding that the particular case was not ripe).
111. See Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003); Brief Submitted on Behalf
of 74 Concerned Law Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Request of
Appellants for Reversal at 15-21, Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (No. 03-1266) [here-
inafter Brief]; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL
ANSwERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992) (arguing
that the Court should apply the same constitutional analysis in foreign affairs
that it applies to domestic concerns).
112. See supra notes 15, 18.
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in the Constitution is irrelevant."3 Whether the war can take
place without such a declaration,114 or whether there has been
"sufficient" evidence of congressional involvement with the
President in the decision are not important."5  The signifi-
cance of the War Powers Act and whether "hostilities" have
taken place so as to trigger the Act do not matter.1 6 It is ir-
relevant if Congress has alternative means of "self-help"
within its legislative province and therefore does not need to
invoke the judicial power."7 As argued before, the federal
government lacks the power to engage in a preemptive attack
against another action, even if both political branches agree
and Congress files a declaration of war.
If the federal government lacks the constitutional power
to even engage in preemptive war, many other ideas associ-
ated with the political question doctrine, likewise, have no
purchase. The traditional political question arguments con-
cerning the textual commitment of war to the political
branches-including the theory that structurally the founders
intended the legislative and executive branches to provide
systematic checks on the power of war,"8 the notion that Con-
gress and the President must be left free to negotiate over
their relative roles in war, and the idea that courts have no
competency to interfere with this most extreme tool of foreign
relations and diplomacy-do not matter. The courts cannot
have any interest in helping the federal government pursue a
power under the circumstances when they determine that the
federal government does not possess such a power (i.e., the
power to wage preemptive war). Determining when the fed-
eral government has acted beyond its limited powers is the
very type of decision for which the judicial branch is uniquely
competent.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Note that
whether Congress delegated the power to attack Iraq in the "October Resolu-
tion," H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (2001), and if it did, whether that delegation
would be constitutional, are irrelevant issues. Brief, supra note 111, at 13-16.
Congress cannot delegate a power which the federal government does not pos-
sess.
116. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971).
117. See Broughton, supra note 25, at 717.
118. See Yoo, supra note 20, at 170. These checks involve Congress's control
of funding and impeachment and the President's power to veto.
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2. A Limited Review on the Issue of 'Imminence"
Involves a Justiciable Decision
There was little question that the war in Iraq was pre-
emptive. But what if the matter was in dispute, with the
government contesting a plaintiff's claims of a lack of "immi-
nence?"1 '9 How would a court, without stepping back into the
mire of the political question doctrine, resolve this seemingly
factual question underlying the constitutional decision of
whether this is "anticipatory" self-defense (constitutional) or
"preemptive" self-defense (unconstitutional)? In response to
that concern, this article proposes a limited legal review
within a system of shifting burdens.2 '
VI. AUTHOR'S PROPOSAL TO IMPOSE SHIFTING PROCEDURAL
BURDENS ON THE PLAINTIFF AND GOVERNMENT
A. The Plaintiffs Burden
First, the plaintiff must carry the burden of establishing
a prima facie showing that the government's proposed use of
military force was not in response to an "imminent threat,"
and thereby, constituted preemptive war. Without this bur-
119. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19 (1827), superficially appears to speak to these
issues. In that case, the Court refused to question the judgment of the Presi-
dent whether "sufficient danger of invasion" existed to justify calling up the mi-
litia under a federal statute. The decision in Mott makes sense because the
Court was asked to decide whether the threat of invasion was in fact imminent.
The President must be able to respond quickly to the threat of invasion, and the
judiciary is in a poor position to second-guess him on the question of assembling
troops. Whether or not there is "in fact" a threat of invasion is a judgment for
the commander in chief and the military. The Constitution has committed the
prosecution of war to the executive, and the President and military hierarchy,
as a practical matter, possess the requisite information and expertise to make
the determination to engage in war. The Court lacks this competence. As I dis-
cuss in this section, however, determining whether and when to prosecute war
is not at all the type of judicial decision I am proposing. Moreover, Mott in-
volved a power granted under statute. Id. at 39. In contrast, the current issue
about the legitimacy of preemptive war involves the very existence of a constitu-
tional power. Whether the federal government's actions in committing troops
fall on the constitutional or unconstitutional side of the line cannot be left to the
ipse dixit of that same federal government.
120. This decision-making format is roughly modeled upon Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), employed by courts in assessing whether preemptory
challenges have been used by the prosecution for racial purposes. The com-
plaining defendant first must make a prima facie showing of a "pattern of dis-
crimination." Id. at 97. Only then must the government present evidence that
its challenges had neutral, non-racial explanations.
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den of proof by the plaintiff, the government could be dragged
into court every time it commits troops in order to justify its
actions as non-preemptive. Allowing such litigation could in-
terfere with the serious business carried out by those guiding
our nation and making the difficult decisions concerning the
military. Requiring the plaintiff to make this initial showing
precludes the possibility that a claim of unconstitutional pre-
emptive war can be raised absent a strong initial proof.
B. The Government's Burden
If, and only if, the plaintiff meets its initial burden, the
government must respond by providing the court in camera
with evidence12' that the proposed use of force was not pre-
121. The State will certainly resist such an inspection by claiming a privilege
under national security and military secrets, and the courts will take this claim
very seriously. See also Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d
395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (indicating that the privilege for state secrets is "abso-
lute"); United States v. TRW, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (also
indicating that the privilege for state secrets is "absolute"); cf, e.g., United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (rejecting Nixon's claim of privilege
and noting that "He does not place his claim of privilege on the ground they are
military or diplomatic secrets"). Ultimately, however, I do not believe the ex-
ecutive can successfully oppose the in camera review.
In the first place, even should such a claim be found to bar in camera
review, it is difficult to see how the ban on in camera review would benefit the
government. The question of an in camera review only takes place at the point
in my proposal when the burden has already shifted to the government. With-
out presenting evidence of "imminence" to the court, privileged or otherwise, the
government cannot show that its proposed actions are constitutional. Moreover,
the required showing for "imminence" would not necessarily involve revealing
sources, methods of information gathering, exact sites of anticipated enemy at-
tacks, or actual secret documents. A more general presentation might suffice so
long as it principally consisted of concrete evidence rather than solely "take our
word for it" conclusions.
In the second place, I do not believe that even as powerful a privilege as
involved in state/military secrets would bar the inspection under our particular
circumstances where the claim is that the federal government is exceeding its
constitutional authority in pursuing a preemptive use of military force. In such
a case, the information will only be seen by a federal judge, not by plaintiffs or
other third parties. Further, national security and military secrets are not "re-
lational" privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, where the policies un-
derlying the privilege would be violated if a third party (even a federal judge) is
made privy to the information. In contrast, the issue surrounding third parties
viewing military secrets would not involve any breach of a confidential relation-
ship, but, rather, involve trust concerning the recipient of the information not
revealing the contents. In this regard, a federal judge would seem as good a se-
curity risk as some members of the armed forces or other departments of the
executive branch. Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that, with the
appropriate prima facie showing, even material falling under the claim of a re-
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emptive, but "anticipatory" (i.e., the risk of harm to U.S. in-
terests was imminent or a clear and present danger existed).
However, the court will not decide whether in fact the use
of force was or was not "anticipatory." That is a judgment for
the commander in chief and the military. The Constitution
commits the executive branch to oversee the prosecution of
war, and the President and military hierarchy possess the
requisite information and expertise to make that determina-
tion. Courts lack such competence.
Courts may only decide whether, if based on the evidence
the government provides, they find that a "reasonable person"
could find imminence and/or clear and present danger. In
other words, the court only must find something akin to the
"reasonable fact-finder" standard of Federal Rule of Evidence
104(b). 2' This standard requires sufficient evidence that a
reasonable fact-finder "could" find the factual proposition in
lational privilege may be subject to an in camera inspection. See United States
v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (stating that with sufficient evidence to support a
"reasonable belief' that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privi-
lege may apply, the court may order in camera inspection of materials claimed
privileged).
Finally, the courts are a co-equal branch of government, charged with
providing a constitutional check on the legislature and executive. The courts
will ultimately decide the scope of any executive claim of privilege, Nixon, 418
U.S. at 697, particularly given the fact that executive privilege is a creature of
common law. Northrop Corp., 751 F.2d at 399. As such, there is no reason for
the courts to support a claim by the executive that would thwart the courts'
ability to carry out their constitutional role (here, insuring that the federal gov-
ernment does not exceed the power granted it under the war power). But see
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). In Reynolds, the Court noted:
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the
case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the
privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the
security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.
Id. at 10.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that this language controls our situation. The
language is obvious dicta, and it arises in the context of a torts dispute, not an
action testing the constitutional limits of our government to commit military
troops to a war. Although it may not be worth the risk of giving even a federal
judge (and perhaps select staff) access to such information in a torts dispute, the
power of the government to commit troops to war, involving a fundamental
check on federal constitutional power, would seem to warrant a different risk
analysis.
122. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
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issue,' 2' and provides the framework for a legal, as opposed to
a political, decision.
Perhaps the federal government will have little difficulty
in crafting its presentation to meet this standard whenever it
desires. Perhaps it will be able to scare judges with stories
about the terrible consequences to the United States if the
government does not launch an attack, and that no judge will
take the personal responsibility of finding that the required
showing has not been met and, therefore, the military may
not strike. Perhaps the military will show the judge totally
false information because no one else will see the information.
These hypothetical possibilities, however, do not mean
that the process will be an empty formality. In making the
required showing, the legislative and executive branches
must at least present something other than a few sound bites
to justify their actions. Also, because all of these actions
would take place against a legal and cultural backdrop where
preemptive war has been declared unconstitutional, the very
existence of court review in the area would reasonably affect
the federal government's initial decisions on the actual use of
military force as much as it inevitably would inform the
rhetoric of the government's attorneys should they ever have
to justify those decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
A review of the philosophy underlying the Constitution,
the "just war" doctrine, the founders' view on the role of war,
the possible permanent effect on the constitutional structure,
and the 214-year experience in using military force reasona-
bly leads one to the conclusion that the employment of pre-
emptive self-defense or preemptive war is beyond the power
given the federal government. Nevertheless, the United
States has attacked Iraq and, with that action, lost another
piece of what (if any) is left of its national innocence. Use of
military force against Iraq, which should be viewed as uncon-
stitutional, must not now be seen as a legal precedent1 4 and
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., CHOMSKY, supra note 3, at 21:
After the invasion of Iraq was declared a success, it was publicly recog-
nized that one motive for the war had been to establish the imperial
grand strategy as a new norm: "Publication of the [National Security
Strategy] was-the signal that Iraq would be the first test, not the last,"
2004
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next used to justify some similar incursions into countries
like Iran or North Korea. The next time, the courts should
act in this completely justiciable arena, and should define the
constitutional limits of the federal power to employ military
force.
POSTSCRIPT
The author has intimated that the founders would have
been too wise to condone the use of military force in the con-
duct of a preemptive war. Recent events have further clari-
fied the inherently problematic nature of a preemptive war.
First, because preemptory war does not require the other na-
tion to actually attack or be in the process of carrying out an
imminent attack, it is all too easy for an administration to
create the "threat" that is then used as the basis for the pre-
emptive war. Weapons of mass destruction, claims in a State
of the Union address about enriched uranium purchases from
Africa, supposed ties between Saddam Hussein and 9/11 ap-
pear at this time not to have been well-founded.'25 Second,
the New York Times reported. Iraq became the Petri dish in which this
experiment in pre-emptive policy grew." A high official added that "we
will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-
defense by acting pre-emptively," now that the norm has been estab-
lished.
Id.
125. On weapons of mass destruction:
In an interview on Dec. 16, television anchorwoman Diane Sawyer
pressed Bush on the fact that no unconventional weapons had been
found in Iraq some nine months after the search had begun. Bush kept
interjecting: "Yet." Sawyer persisted, asking about the administra-
tion's flat statements that Saddam had such weapons versus the mere
possibility that he could acquire them. An exacerbated Bush replied:
"So what's the difference?"
Helen Thomas, Some Words Better Left Unuttered, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 30, 2001, at B6; see also Thomas L. Freidman, Presidents
Remade by War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at 13, section 4 (observing that no
weapons of mass destruction were unearthed to that point, and that Bush, like
Presidents of past, redefined the rationale for war, in this case from weapons of
mass destruction to bringing democracy to Iraq); The President's News Confer-
ence; Sidestepping on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A24; Reviewing the
Intelligence in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2003, at A14; Was the Intelligence
Cooked N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, at 12, section 4.
On the alleged attempt by Saddam to buy enriched uranium, one article
noted, "In his January 28, 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush
stated, 'The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."' Office of the Press Sec-
retary, President Delivers 'State of the Union," Jan. 28, 2003, at
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even if you triumph in a preemptive war, things are far from
easy. Because the defeated nation never really did anything
to you, it is a bit difficult to have any legitimacy in the eyes of
those you are occupying. You are an aggressor nation, an oc-
cupier, and therefore the likelihood of a patriotically-inspired
resistance movement against your occupying forces is sub-
stantial.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01. At the time, the intelligence
community already knew that this information was false. See James Risen,
Debating a Leak: News Analysis; All Roads Lead to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2003, at Al; David E. Sanger & Carl Hulse, After the War: War's Rationale;
Bush Charge on Iraq Arms Had Doubters, House Told, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2003, at A10; Richard W. Stevenson, After the War: CIA Uproar; White House
Tells How Bush Came to Talk of Iraq Uranium, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2003, at
A6; Joseph C. Wilson, What I Didn't Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, at
9, section 4.
On the connection between Saddam and 9/11, one writer noted that in
spite of the stance of hardliners at the Pentagon and the White House, "the
C.I.A. and F.B.I. eventually concluded that.., there was no hard evidence that
Mr. Hussein's government was involved in the Sept. 11 plot." James Risen, A
Region Inflamed: Inquiry; Iraqi Agent Denies He Met 9/11 Hijacker in Prague
Before Attacks on the US., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2003, at A10.
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